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Abstract: A major challenge for most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is the evaluation of the 
exchange rate. This is more so in the East African Community (EAC) where macroeconomic 
and exchange rate management has been in particular challenged by massive foreign aid 
inflows partly as a result of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and other debt 
reliefs. In addition; improved macroeconomic management in the last decade attracted both 
short and medium to long term inflows to the region, as foreign investors turn to developing 
and emerging economies for yield. In this paper we estimate the fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate (FEER) model for all the countries in the EAC and we assess the convergence 
of existing exchange rate regimes in the EAC. Our main contribution is that this exercise may 
contribute as a useful background for the ultimate decision of which exchange rate 
management framework will best fit the region during the transition period to monetary 
union. 
JEL: F31; F41; C32 
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Introduction 
East African Community (EAC)1 overdependence on commodity exports is a bless and a 
curse in terms of exchange rate. Maintaining competitiveness and a greater flexibility 
allowing the exchange rate dynamics to be driven by the underlying macroeconomic 
fundamentals is a key policy challenge. This has even been stressed with the drive to form a 
monetary union – which then calls for establishing an appropriate exchange rate management 
during the transition period.  
With relatively sustained period of good policies that have attracted both official and 
private capital inflows to the region, the challenge to avoid the “Dutch Disease” syndrome 
has also further complicated exchange rate management (Younger, 1992 and Corden and 
Neary, 1982). In addition, a general move towards greater exchange rate flexibility in the 
region complicated exchange rate management in these countries (see Table 1). A major 
contribution to policy making in the region would be to establish whether the existing 
exchange rate regimes have led to convergence and which different exchange rate regimes 
would better serve the monetary integration better.  
In this paper we estimate the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) model for all 
the countries in the EAC and we assess the convergence of existing exchange rate regimes in 
the EAC. Our main contribution is that this exercise may contribute as a useful background 
for the ultimate decision of which exchange rate management framework will best fit the 
region during the transition period to monetary union. 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways: it applies the concept of an 
equilibrium exchange rate for a recent dataset of African countries which is unique regarding 
the application of this methodology. Secondly, giving the recently EAC political compromise 
                                                 
1 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
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to stabilish a single currency area by 20242, this work evaluates the differences between 
estimated and real equilibrium exchange rate in the region. Calculated estimatives shows that 
countries in the region have been receiving similar shocks, reflecting a similar behavior over 
the real exchange rate – which is preferable in a monetary union. However, the design of a 
proper monetary union goes way beyond an exchange rate analysis, which we discuss later in 
the conclusion.    
TABLE 1  
Exchange Rate Regimes in the EAC countries 
1. Burundi maintains, de jure and de facto, a managed float. However, it has a multiple 
currency practice and it also maintains certain foreign exchange restrictions for security 
reasons.  
2. Kenya maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on payments and transfers 
for current international transactions. 
3. Rwanda’s exchange rate system is classified as a conventional peg. Rwanda 
maintains a system free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international 
transactions.  
4. Tanzania maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of 
payments and transfers for current international transactions. Tanzania maintains a floating 
exchange rate regime.  
5. Uganda maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of payments 
for current international transactions. 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Country Report No. 08/282, August 2008; IMF Country Report No. 10/26, 
January 2010; IMF Country Report No. 09/58, February 2009; IMF Country Report No. 09/179, June 2009; IMF Country 
Report No. 09/79, March 2009. 
                                                 
2 East African Monetary Union (EAMU) Protocol was signed in November 30rd, 2013.  
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Literature Review 
Despite the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement in 1973, a great number of countries 
retained some inflexibility in exchange rate regimes. As most countries did not move to a 
freely market determined exchange rate, setting the appropriate value of the nominal 
exchange rate remained a major challenge to macroeconomic policy making. The challenge 
has been (and continues to be) the avoidance of long periods of misalignment, especially in 
developing countries that are dependent on exports of raw materials (commodities etc.) as a 
major source of foreign exchange inflows (Montiel and Hinkle, 1999). The severe 
macroeconomic crisis during the 90’s brought back the importance of “getting the exchange 
rate right” to constantly maintain a competitive environment. 
Edwards (1989) earlier attempts to provide theoretical underpinnings of exchange rate 
misalignments in developing countries. He defined the equilibrium real exchange rate as the 
relative price of tradables to nontradables. This relative price results in simultaneous 
attainment of both internal and external equilibrium for set of given sustainable steady state 
values and other relevant variables – such as taxes, international prices, and technology. By 
this definition, there is internal equilibrium when the goods market (nontradables) clears in 
the current period and it is expected to be in equilibrium in the future period. Similarly, 
external equilibrium is achieved when the actual and future current account balances are 
compatible with long-run sustainable flows.  
Edwards (1989) identified key variables that influence both the internal and external 
positions of an economy, called “fundamentals”. These included terms of trade, government 
consumption of nontradables, capital flows, trade and exchange rate control, investment 
position and measure of technological progress. Using these fundamentals, he estimated 
different equations for the equilibrium real exchange rate for 10 countries chosen by data 
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availability3 with pooled data and fixed-effects estimation techniques with country specific 
dummies. The conclusion is that excess supply of credit, represented by the government 
consumption of nontradables, contributes to an appreciation of the real exchange rate; and 
similarly, an increase in the terms of trade and technological progress causes the real 
exchange rate to appreciate. However, he found that capital inflows tend to depreciate the 
exchange rate.  
Recent works have overcome challenges with data and econometric methodologies by 
estimating the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) for African countries. For 
example, Iimi (2006) estimated the behavioral equilibrium real exchange rate for Botswana; 
Loukoianova and Iossifov (2007) did a similar exercise for Ghana; Bems and De Carvalho 
Filho (2009) estimated for the oil exporting countries; Eyraud (2009) does the estimation for 
Madagascar. 
Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005) made a major contribution to the empirical literature in 
Africa by estimating the ERER using a panel cointegration and common factor analysis. They 
derived a number of common factors that explain the dynamics of the real exchange rate in 
the sample and found that fundamentals such as productivity, terms of trade, and openness 
were strongly related to those common factors in low-income countries4, but no such link was 
found for the middle-income countries. 
                                                 
3 Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Greece, India, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand and Yugoslavia. Annually data was used from 1963-1983, depending of 
the country. 
4 Low-income countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Gambia, Haiti, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nepal, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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The link between aid and the “Dutch Disease” has been explored by a number of studies 
which observe the macroeconomic management and increased aid inflows to most African 
countries. Sy and Tabarraei (2010) did not find relevant evidence between real exchange rate 
and foreign aid in a pool of developing countries, however, Opoku-Afari et al. (2004) found 
that capital inflows appreciated the real exchange rate in Ghana depending on the degree of 
reversibility of the capital inflows. Even though different studies continue to find mixed 
results between capital inflows and real exchange rate (RER), with increased inflows to Sub 
Saharan African (SSA) countries in the last decade, it is still relevant to empirically test the 
relevance of capital inflows as a key fundamental driving real exchange rate in this region.   
Theoretical Model  
In line with Montiel (1999), we consider a two composite goods market (tradables and 
non-tradables) and define internal balance (IB) as the condition where the non-tradables 
goods market clears in the current period and is expected to be in equilibrium in the future on 
the assumption that production of all non-traded goods is consumed by both governments and 
households. This is expressed as equation (1) below. 
  (1 )N N N Ny e c g ec g                   (1) 
where Ny  is the supply of non-tradable goods given full employment, e is the real 
exchangerate, c is total private spending, with   being the proportion of this total private 
spending on traded goods and Ng  represents government consumption of non-traded goods. 
The above shows the IB position where the real exchange rate (RER) is inversely related to 
consumption. This follows from the fact that, if we start from an initial equilibrium IB 
position, then an increase in private spending (c ) results in an excess demand for non-
tradable goods at the initial real exchange rate. To restore equilibrium, a real exchange rate 
appreciation is required to promote supply of non-tradable goods and increase demand for 
tradable goods. 
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Similarly, the external balance (EB) is defined as the current account balance that is 
compatible with long-run capital flows. This is represented as: 
( ) ( )T Tf y e g c z rf                     (2) 
where f  is change in net foreign assets over time, f is total net foreign assets, r is the real 
yield on the foreign assets (measured in traded goods), ( )Ty e  is the production of traded 
goods locally, Tg  is government consumption of traded goods, c is total private consumption 
with   representing the proportion of private consumption on traded goods,   captures 
transaction costs associated with private spending, with z and rf capturing net aid inflows and 
external debt service respectively. 
Equation (2) states that EB is given by trade balance (that is, domestic output of traded 
goods net of local consumption of these goods) and net aid inflows minus costs on foreign 
debt. In equilibrium, EB has a positive relationship between consumption and RER because, 
assuming it started from an equilibrium position (initial EB), an increase of private spending 
would generate a current account deficit at the original real exchange rate. To restore 
equilibrium, RER must depreciate. Depreciation would then switch demand towards non-
traded goods and supply towards traded goods. As established so far, whereas an increase in 
private spending in IB yields to appreciation of the real exchange rate (that is increase in the 
supply of non-traded goods), a similar shock in EB yields depreciation and promotes an 
increase in the supply of traded goods. The overall effect of the two markets, that is IB and 
EB, produces the equilibrium real exchange rate which is consistent with the fundamentals 
determining the RER. 
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By setting equation (2) to zero, the EB is then defined by the trade balance, aid inflows 
and foreign debt.  
  ( )T Ty e g c z rf                      (3) 
Solving equations (3) and (1) simultaneously yields the equilibrium exchange rate that should 
be a function of: 
* *( , , , , )N Te e g g r z                  (4) 
 where  is the rate of inflation in the domestic price of traded goods and  is the world 
interest rate.  
Elbadawi (1994) and Baffes et al. (1997) both modified equation (4) by including policy 
variables such as terms of trade and productivity. This paper will adopt both proposed 
modifications. 
Regression Results – Panel Cointegration Analysis 
We used a balanced panel data for the 5 EAC countries from 1980 until 2015 (180 
observations) to investigate the long-run relationship between the real effective exchange rate 
a set of fundamentals in the region. 
We estimate equation (4) using the panel procedure because of the increased power that 
may be gained by accounting not only for the time-series dimension but also for the cross-
sectional dimension. A representation of the long-run behavior in a panel is done by 
estimating the equation using DOLS5. The empirical estimation is approximately: 
ititiitiitiitiiit uLGEXPLAIDLOPENLTOTLREER  4321      (5) 
Where LREER is the logarithm of the ratio of the traded-weighted index of foreign wholesale 
prices expressed in local currency to the home CPI. LTOT is the logarithm of the index of 
relative prices of exports to imports (goods and services). LOPEN is the logarithm of imports 
                                                 
5 Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (see Kao and Chiang (2001)). 
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plus exports ratio to GDP. LAID is the total official aid receipted in dolar, converted to local 
currency, to nominal GDP ratio. LGEXP is the logarithm of nominal government 
consumption to nominal GDP ratio, measuring how government expenditure on non tradables 
occurs.  
Panel estimation of equation (5) requires equilibrium errors to be stationary. First, we 
evaluated if the real exchange rate and the fundamentals are nonstationary. We test each 
variable for a unit root using Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003). The results in Table 2 
point that we cannot reject the null of unit root using either the Levin-Lin-Chu or Im-Pesaran-
Shin tests.  
TABLE 2.  
Panel Unit Root Tests 
Tests REER OPEN TOT AID Gov. Exp.  
Levin-Lin-Chu -0.6445  
(0.2596) 
-0.1371   
(0.4455) 
-1.7153*    
(0.0431) 
-0.3732    
(0.3545) 
0.1013   
(0.5403) 
Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
-0.0767  
(0.4694) 
-0.4673  
(0.3201) 
-1.0339    
(0.1506) 
-0.9497  
(0.1711) 
 
-1.0878    
(0.1383) 
Pooled ADF test, 2 lags, using constant. Adjusted t*, p-values in parenthesis, 2 lags, using 
constant.* Rejected at 1%. Tests ran in Stata 14. 
Source: own calculations. 
We found evidence that real exchange rates and the fundamentals are nonstationary, so we 
performed panel cointegration tests to look for stable long run relationships among them. If a 
set of variables is cointegrated, the residuals from the cointegrating equation should be 
stationary. Table 3 presents the results for the Kao and Pedroni panel cointegration tests. The 
null hypothesis for all of the tests is that the residuals of the cointegrating vectors contain unit 
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roots, implying no cointegration. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for the 
Kao test and for 4 out of 7 statistics in the Pedroni test. Thus, overall we reject unit roots in 
the residuals of the cointegrating vectors. This is the same as finding strong evidence for 
cointegration of real exchange rates, openness degree, terms of trade, aid flow and 
government expenditure. 
TABLE 3.  
Panel Cointegration Tests 
Kao Residual Cointegration Test* 
ADF 
-5.0989 
(0.000) 
  
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test** 
Panel v-Statistic Panel PP-Statistic Panel rho-Statistic Panel ADF-Statistic 
--0.0366 
(0.5146) 
-2.2789 
(0.0113) 
-0.7310 
(0.2324) 
-2.2810 
(0.0113) 
Group rho-Statistic Group PP-Statistic Group ADF-Statistic  
0.0215 
(0.5086) 
-1.6413 
(0.0504) 
-1.6210 
(0.0525) 
 
* No deterministic constant or trend. Automatic 9 lags choice using Schwarz Information 
Criterion. 
** No deterministic constant or trend, Automatic Schwarz Info Criterion with a max lag of 7.  
P-values in parenthesis. 
Source: own calculations using Eviews 9, student version lite. 
Under the assumption of I(1) cointegrated variables, the pooled mean group estimator  
(PMG) of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) is one recent solution for cointegrating panels. The 
model takes the cointegration form of an autoregressive distributed lag model and adapts it 
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for a panel setting by allowing the intercepts, short-run coefficients and cointegrating terms to 
differ across cross-sections.  
In order to assess the speed at which the real exchange rate adjusts towards its long run 
cointegrating relationship the model is estimated in an error correction specification. This 
includes changes of the real exchange rate on the lag of the error correction term as well as on 
lagged changes of the real exchange rate and of the other right hand side variables entering 
the baseline. The coefficient of the error correction term was of 0.17 suggesting that a shock 
to the gap would have a half life of about 3.5  years6. Table 4 reports the estimation results. 
TABLE 4.  
Regression Results 
Long-run 
LTOT  0.479 
(5.11) 
LOPEN  -0.434 
(-4.03) 
LAID  -0.078 
(-1.26) 
LGExp -0.148 
(-1.46) 
Short-run  
Intercept 0.290 
                                                 
6 The half-life of a unit shock (the amount of time it takes for 50 percent of the effect of the 
shock to die out) can be inferred from coefficient of ECM term in error correction equation 
using the following formula: ln(0.5)/ln(1+error correction coefficient) (David et al., 2014). 
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(1.80) 
Δ LREER 0.183 
(1.65) 
Δ LTOT -0.06   
(-2.17) 
Δ LOPEN 0.116 
(0.95) 
Δ LAID -0.177 
(-3.82) 
Δ LGExp -0.065 
(-1.308) 
Error correction term -0.177 
(-1.737) 
Source: own calculations using Eviews 9, student version lite. 
All variables, except terms of trade, were associated with real exchange rate depreciation. 
Government consumption associated with real exchange rate depreciation is usually the case 
under the presumption that government spending on tradables is higher than private spending. 
An improvement in the terms of trade causing an appreciation to the real exchange rate is the 
case of a strong substitution effect. 
Aid inflows are in the long run associated with a more depreciated exchange rate, 
potentially indicating a positive effect on productivity in the nontradable sector relative to the 
tradable sector. Aid is generally considered to push up domestic prices (especially of 
nontradables), thus leading to a real exchange rate appreciation (Dutch disease) in the short-
run, i.e. when the supply side of the economy has not had a chance to adjust. In the long run, 
however, an increase in aid would be consistent with real exchange rate depreciation if it 
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would raise productivity of nontradables relative to the productivity of tradables (Torvik, 
2001). This is due the fact that in most cases aid to these countries (and for that matter most 
SSA) have higher import content, thus implying higher degree of reversibility of foreign 
exchange inflows (leakages). Opoku-Afari et al. (2004), for example, found similar results for 
Ghana. Countries where aid causes appreciation could be the case of greater part of the 
(untied) aid flow going to direct budget support.  
A higher degree of openness, as expected by the literature, is associated with real 
exchange rate depreciation. All coefficients are statistically significant, with the exception of 
terms of trade. 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
Using the long-run estimated coefficients in the panel and the countries’ specific effect we 
estimate the equilibrium exchange rate by each country and compare it with the real exchange 
rate as shown in Figure 1.  
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FIGURE 1. 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
 
In general, the actual real effective exchange rate appears to be broadly in line with the 
fundamentals in all the countries. In the last years, most of the real exchange rates in the 
region are overvaluated in relation to the estimated exchange rate – similar result obtained 
using the univariated analysis. The differences between the two models occurred mainly in 
 15 
 
Burundi and Kenya, where there was a greater percentual difference. Figure 2 plots the 
degree of misalignments measured as mis
RER ERERRER
ERER
 .  
FIGURE 2. 
Degree of Misalignment 
 
Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Union—Which Way for the EAC 
The observed long-run real exchange rate among the EAC countries suggests a reduction 
in misalignment and that it takes approximately 3.5 years to restore a long-run equilibrium 
following distortions in the region. This might be an indicator that the region has been 
receiving similar shocks, reflecting a similar behavior over the real exchange rate. This 
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similarity is important because, as pointed by Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), when countries 
are both ex-ante and ex-post identical (that is, they all have the same finance needs and are hit 
by identical shocks), monetary unification is preferred to autonomy.  
From the perspective of each individual country, policy responses to the shock are optimal 
and the government budget constraint is properly internalized in the policy decisions, while 
distortions (the incentive to generate an inflation surprise) are alleviated with the union 
central bank internalizing the cross-border externalities of inflation surprises. With countries 
that are identical in terms of finance needs, but not necessarily in terms of shocks, the choice 
between unification and autonomy generally involves a trade off among the effects discussed 
above. 
Monetary union implies the adoption of a single currency and countries agree in fixing 
their exchange rate. So, they must agree on a joint design of monetary policy and on the 
division of seignorage revenues. The common monetary policy helps to stabilize the 
exchange rate and, as a relative price between two currencies, the cost of resisting to a 
speculative attack should be smaller. Since the five countries have similar trade pattern 
(based on commodity exports), monetary unification eliminates the possibility of nominal 
exchange rate adjustments among its members and effectively forces countries to coordinate 
their national monetary policies. The common monetary policy conducted by the union’s 
central bank allows countries to achieve the same outcomes for output, but with lower 
inflation. 
The adoption of a common currency brings up a question about the exchange rate regime. 
A growing recent literature analyzes monetary unions in the context of micro-founded New-
Keynesian type of models characterized by nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. 
Examples are Benigno (2004), which is extended by Beetsma and Jensen (2005) to include 
fiscal policy. These papers characterize optimal policies in monetary unions. However, in 
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terms of maximum achievable welfare, these unions are indeed generally dominated by a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Other related contributions are Pappa and Vassilatos (2007), 
Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009).  
The advantage of monetary autonomy in New-Keynesian models also depends rather 
critically on the degree of exchange rate pass-through in import prices, as demonstrated by 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) and Devereux and Engel (2003). The standard assumption is that 
there is full pass-through. However, in reality prices of imported products often show only 
limited variation in response to exchange rate changes. The simple two-country exposition in 
Corsetti (2008) shows that when pass-though is completely absent, i.e. prices are preset in the 
currency of the destination market (also referred to as local currency pricing), the optimal 
monetary policies under autonomy effectively result into a fixed exchange rate.   
Of course, the choice to join a monetary union can bring benefits but it implies costs. 
Table 6 summarizes benefits and costs of having a common currency. 
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TABLE 5.  
Benefits and Costs of the Adoption of a Common Currency 
Benefits Costs 
- Reduced transaction costs from currency 
conversion; 
- Loss of the ability to use the monetary 
policy to respond to country-specific 
macroeconomic disturbances; 
- Reduced accounting costs and greater 
predictability of relative prices for firms 
doing business across the region; 
- Loss of the ability to use inflation to reduce 
the real burden of public debt; 
- Insulation from monetary disturbances and 
speculative bubbles that might lead to 
unnecessary fluctuations in real exchange 
rate; 
- Political problems may arise in determining 
how member countries split seignorage 
revenue; 
- Less political pressure for trade protection 
because of shifts in real exchange rates. 
 
- Speculative attacks may arise during the 
transition from individual currencies to a 
common currency. 
Source: Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
Conclusion 
Evidence from the estimations show that the actual real exchange rate have moved broadly 
in line with the fundamentals in all the countries in the EAC in recent years, as shown by 
reducing misalignments over time (Figure 2). The analysis showed that it takes 
approximately 3.5 years to restore a long-run equilibrium following distortions in the region. 
The panel analysis showed that all fundamentals were associated with the real exchange 
rate in the region, mainly having a depreciating effect. For instance, if government 
consumption is related with real exchange rate depreciation, it is usually the case that 
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government spending on tradables is higher than private spending. An improvement in the 
terms of trade also depreciates the real exchange rate which might be the case of a higher 
income effect than the substitution effect. Aid inflows are in the long run associated with a 
more depreciated exchange rate, potentially indicating either a positive effect on the 
productivity in the nontradable sector or to the fact that aid inflows have higher import 
content, causing leakages. A higher degree of openness, as expected by the literature, is 
associated with real exchange rate depreciation.  
Estimated long-run real exchange rate among the EAC countries suggests a reduction in 
misalignment for all countries, excepting for Burundi and Kenya. Diminishing misalignments 
indicate the region has been receiving similar shocks, reflecting a similar behavior over the 
real exchange rate. This similarity is important because a monetary unification is preferred 
under each country’s autonomy, suggesting the implementation of a common currency in the 
region might benefit all countries.  
Challenges to the design of a proper monetary union go way further though. First 
movements regarding the integration of the EAC countries started in 1967, but the union 
collapsed in 1977 when Tanzania closed its border with Kenya.  Hazlewood (1979) points 
that the monetary union idea was abandoned after the failure to find an acceptable system for 
a regional central banking. Other issue regarding the integration is the absence of a sovereign 
regional body to overlook individual’s countries policies. As an intergovernmental treaty, any 
economic shock solution depends on the individual governments' cooperation.  
A major requirement for the success of the Monetary Union and the EAC is the 
continuation of the cultivation of excellent relations and peace between the countries. Further 
research in the area could include institutional quality analysis as approached by Nnyanzi, 
Babyenda and Bbale (2016).   
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